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RECENT ADJUSTMENTS,
AND CONTINUING PROBLEMS
FARM mortgage distress in the United States during the inter-
war period cannot be explained by any one cause, or even by
any specific combination of causes. Although most of the dis-
tress had its origin in the World War I boom and the two post-
war slumps, there were other important contributing factors,
which are evidenced by the pronounced variations in distress
that occurred among geographic areas and even among individ-
ual farms within areas. Among the contributing causes are: dif-
ferences in price behavior and in inflation of land values and
debts; problems of settlement in new areas; natural hazards
such as weather and insect pests; high fixed costs; technological
changes; and the common difficulty of properly differentiating
between good land and poor land in making loans. Complicat-
ing factors in many instances were unwise loan practices and
unsound financial condition of banks and other lenders.
Differences in Price Behavior
Farm prices, incomes, and debts did not increase equally in all
parts of the country during the wartime boom, nor did prices
and incomes decline equally in the depression years. Prices of
food .grains and meat animals, for example, averaged higher
during the period 1915-19incomparison to the prewar level
than did prices of dairy products, but after the war their rela-
tive decline was much the greater (Table 29). The price of
cotton rose to comparatively higher levels during the war years
and remained at higher levels during the early twenties than
did prices of dairy products, but its decline during the thirties
was more severe.
These differences in price behavior partly account for dif-
ferences in the severity of distress that developed in various
parts of the country. They help to explain, for example, why
debt distress developed early and was more severe in the Great
Plains, which produces livestock and grain, than in the North-
east, which produces large quantities of dairy products. They
also help to explain why the great cotton-producing areas of theCAUSES, ADJUSTMENTS, PROBLEMS 181
TABLE 29
Index Numbers of Prices Received by Farmers for
Selected Crops and Livestock Products, 1915.39
(1910-14 =ioo)
Product 1915-19 1920-24 1925-2 9 1930-34 1935-39
Dairy products 147 159 i6i 105 119
Meat animals 162 121 145 83 117
Food grains 193 147 141 70 94
Cotton 175 197 150 77 87
Tobacco 183 189 i6g 117 172
Fruit 126 157 [46 g8 95
From The Agricultural Situation (Bureau of Agricultural Economics), Vol. 37,
No. i(January1953),page
deltacountry avoided acute distress until the thirties. They do
not, however, explain why distress came to the eastern Cotton
Belt a whole decade earlier than it came to the delta area; nor
do they entirely account for the severity of debt distress in the
Great Plains.
Inflation of Land Values and Debts
Shortly before 1900Americanagriculture entered a period of
general prosperity, which had a pronounced effect on the level
of land values. Prices of agricultural products rose more or less
steadily for a period of approximately twenty years culminating
in the World War I boom. Naturally, farm incomes followed
suit. Land values also rose—mainly because of improved farm
incomes, partly because of generally rising prices, and also be-
cause relatively little land was available for homesteading after
1900. The average value of farm land and buildings in the
United States, as reported by the census, was approximately
$20peracre in 1900,$40 rn1910,and$69 in 1920.'
Butrises in land values varied greatly throughout the nation,
just as price rises varied greatly among products. Large per-
centage increases in land values between 1910and1920 were
especially conspicuous in the cotton and tobacco areas of the
Southeast; in a small but intensive cotton area in the delta
region of northwestern Mississippi; in the cotton areas of north-
eastern Texas and southeastern Oklahoma; in the northwestern
part of the Corn Belt; and in a number of fruit and vegetable
1HistoricalStatistics of the United States, 1789-1945(Bureauof the Census,
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areas in Florida, southern Texas, and central California (Fig-
ure 3, Chapter i).Insome of those areas, moreover, the rapid
rise in land values was clearly a speculative phenomenon, ac-
companied by a marked increase in farm mortgage debt. An
example is the northwestern section of the Corn Belt, which
is an excellent farming area. In contrast with the Great Plains
and the eastern Cotton Belt, the northwestern Corn Belt was
not confronted during the interwar period with major adjust-
ments in size of farm and in type and methods of farming, nor
was it confronted with serious production problems except dur-
ing the drought years of the thirties. But the heavy debts that
had been piled up during the period of high wartime prices
and sharply rising land values became a serious burden to
farmers in the northwestern Corn Belt. Although most of these
debts might have been carried, and even slowly retired, under
the price level that prevailed during the twenties, they could
not be carried under the price level that existed in the thirties.
A state by state comparison of the World War I land boom
with subsequent debt distress is afforded by Table 30,which
gives the percentage increase in mortgage debt from 1910to
1920,thepercentage increase in land values from the 1912-14
baseto 1920, and the average number of distress transfers in
1925-34perthousand mortgaged farms in 1930.Itis clear that
distress transfer rates are positively related to the increases in
mortgage debt and slightly less closely related to the increases
in land values.2 Nevertheless, the relationships are not as strik-
ing throughout as they were shown to be for the Corn Belt
(see Table 12,Chapter3), where soils, climate, and types of
farming are far more uniform than in the United States gen-
erally.
A graphic comparison between distress transfers and the rise
in mortgage debt during the decade 1910-20 appears in Figure
39. The scatter diagram shows most of the states—indicated
by unidentified dots—forming a consistent pattern in which
distress transfers are closely related to previous debt increases.
Ten states—indicated by name—fall far outside the pattern.
2Theproduct.moment correlation coefficients work out to +0.60between
distress transfers and rise in debt, +0.46 between distress transfers and rise in
land values, and +0.15betweenrise in debt and rise in land values. The sta-
tistical significance of these coefficients and particularly of the differences between
them is doubtful at best. Moreover, the standard tests of significance are not
strictly applicable here because conditions in one state are usually related to
conditions in the surrounding states.CAUSES, ADJUSTMENTS, PROBLEMS 183
TABLE 30
World War I Inflation and Subsequent Debt Distress
(states arranged in order of percentage increase in mortgage debt)
Average annual
increase in estimatedIncrease in estimated landdistress transfers, 1925-34,
farm mortgage debt values per acre from per i,ooo mortgaged
1910 to1920a
State Percent Rank
1912-14 to1920b farms in i93oc
Percent Rank Percent Rank
Rhode Island 12% 1 30% 3 11.4% 2
New Jersey 33 2 30 4 18.3 4
Pennsylvania 48 3 40 10 29.1 7
Massachusetts 52 4 40 11 13.4 3
New Hampshire 52 5 29 2 21.2 6
New York 56 6 33 6 31.9 9
Maine 6i 7 42 14 37.3 12
Connecticut 63 8 8 10.1 1
Delaware 66 9 39 9 32.6 10
Maryland 8i 10 66 25 40.5 i6
Vermont 11 50 17 21.1 5
Indiana 93 12 6i 23 49.1 25
Michigan 94 13 54 19 48.0 24
Ohio 97 14 59 21 47.6 22
Illinois 99 15 6o 22 57.6 30
Missouri 103 i6 67 27 66.i 36
Kansas iii 17 51 i8 58.4 32
WestVirginia 130 i8 54 20 56.6 29
136 19 71 30 38.6 14
Washington i6i 20 40 12 42.2 19
Louisiana i6i 21 g8 39 55.4 27
Iowa 176 22 113 42 72.5 43
Oregon i76 23 30 5 36.4 11
Texas i8i 24 74 32 37.5 13
South Carolina 189 25 130 48 78.1 46
North Dakota '92 26 i6 62.3 34
Alabama 194 27 77 34 52.5 26
Virginia 202 28 89 38 72.2 42
Mississippi 203 29 ii8 45 70.9 41
Nebraska 215 30 79 36 58.1 31
Kentucky 222 31 100 40 66.9 37
Minnesota 236 32 113 43 64.5 35
Oklahoma 245 33 66 26 47.1 21
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TABLE 30 (continued)
Average annual
Increase in estimatedIncrease in estimated landdistress transfers, 1925-34,
farm mortgage debt values per acre from per x,ooo mortgaged
State
1910 to 1912.14 to.1920b farms in x93oc
Percent Rank Percent Rank Percent Rank
South Dakota 272% 8i% 37 88.8% 48
California 276 35 67 28 40.2 15
North Carolina293 36 123 47 72.5 44
Georgia 296 37 117 44 72.7 45
Tennessee 312 38 100 41 69.5 39
Colorado 314 39 41 13 60.9 33
Nevada 345 40 35 7 45.6 20
Wyoming 383 41 76 33 41.5 i8
Arkansas 384 42 122 46 56.5 28
Florida 459 43 78 35 40.9 17
Idaho 483 44 72 31 47.6 23
Utah 493 45 67 29 29.2 8
New Mexico 556 46 44 15 88.3 47
Arizona 68g 47 24 70.5 40
Montana go6 48 26 1 67.9 38
a Calculatedfrom mortgage debt figures as of January ipresentedin Farm-Mortgage Credit
Facilities in the United States, by Donald C. Horton, Harald C. Larsen, and Norman J. Wall
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, Misc. Pub. No. 478, 1942), Table 64, pages 219 if.
b Calculated from price indexes as of March 1givenin The Farm Real Estate Situation, 1916-
47. by A. R. Johnson (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Circular No. 78o, March 1948), Table
1,page4.
See Figure 7.
Virtually all of the latter are states like Montana, where a large
amount of land was being settled. In such states the mortgage
debt outstanding in 1910 was small, and a very large percentage
increase could easily occur during the ensuing decade, even
without an undue amount of real estate inflation. Utah prob-
ably affords the best example of an area where a large per-
centage increase in debt was built upon a sound agricultural
basis.
In Table 30 there appears to be virtually no relation between
the rise in mortgage debt and the rise in land values. In fact,
the state with the largest increase in debt, Montana, had the
smallest increase in land values. Among numerous explanations
that can be found for this apparent contradiction, two are note-CAUSES, ADJUSTMENTS, PROBLEMS 185
worthy. The first, already mentioned, is that in recently settled
states a relatively small increase in the absolute volume of the
debt may be a very large increase percentagewise. The second
is that land values in the recently settled states probably rose
Figure39. Relation between Increase in Farm Mortgage Debt,
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Distress transfer rote is the average cnnual number of foreclosures, and assignments 10
ovoid foreclosures, over the period1 925-349er thousand mortgaged farms in 1930; see
Figure 7. Data on mortgage debt are from Table 30, For comment on the states named,
see text.
morerapidly than the index indicates, because the most recent
land to be taken into cultivation tended to be the poorer and
cheaper land, which pulled downward, in the average, against
the more expensive, previously settled land.
Newly Settled Areas
Some of the worst mortgage trouble spots that developed dur-
ing the interwar period were in areas that had been settled
from 1900 through the middle 1920'S by people unacquainted186 CAUSES, ADJUSTMENTS, PROBLEMS
with the physical limitations of the regions in which they
located. In some of the newly settled areas the natural pro-
ductivity of soils and climate was too low to permit any type of
arable farming on a profitable basis. In others, the physical
limitations of the region called for the adoption of specialized
farming practices, which were developed only after painful ex-
perience with unsuitable methods. It is true that the prices of
wheat and other grains rose sharply during and immediately
after World War I and greatly stimulated the increase of crop
acreage, land values, and farm debts in the Great Plains. It is
also true that the prices of grains declined very rapidly in the
early twenties. But the rapid rise and fall in the price of one
of the principal products of the Great Plains does not fully
account for the severity of the debt distress there during the
interwar period.
To be profitable over the long run, crop farming in the
plains must be carried on by extensive, dry-farming methods
and on relatively large units. During the period of heaviest
settlement (1900-1920) rainfall over large sections was above
average, and the year to year distribution was somewhat better
than normal. This, together with the high prices for wheat
during the World War I period, not only encouraged the in-
troduction of crop farming into areas unsuited for it in the long
run, but in many cases encouraged inexperienced settlers from
farther east, where rainfall was both more plentiful and more
dependable, to settle on farms that were much too small to
constitute economic units in a semiarid region. Adaptation of
size of farm to the needs of an extensive agriculture was greatly
hindered by the Homestead Act, which even as liberalized in
1909 and 1916 limited each settler to 320 acres for crop farm-
ing and 640 acres for stock raising.
Not only were the typical sizes of farms and much of the
early farming technology in the Great Plains unsuited to that
region, but the banking and credit institutions introduced to
finance agriculture were, if anything, even less well adapted.
In 1914 there were 4,712 commercial banks in the twelve Great
Plains and Mountain states.3 By 1919 the number had increased
to 5,484. Most of them were small local institutions. Even in
1919, deposits averaged only $416,000 per bank. A substantial
proportion of the banks' assets consisted of loans to local
3 Banking and Monetary Statistics (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, '943), pp. 24-33.CAUSES, ADJUSTMENTS, PROBLEMS 187
farmers and ranchers—this in a region subject to violent fluctua-
tions in both production and prices.
Nor were insurance companies, mortgage loan companies, or
federal and joint stock land banks much better organized to
make sound loans in the Great Plains during the World War I
boom. The land banks were newly organized and inexperi-
enced in making loans; and many insurance and mortgage loan
companies were still buying farm mortgages from local brokers
or making mortgage loans through local agents or loan cor-
respondents. Most brokers and local representatives of eastern
lenders were engaged in other activities, including the sale of
farm real estate, and few of them had extensive experience
either in farm appraisal or in making farm loans. Although
there is no direct evidence on the point, it appears that lenders
shared in the general optimism of the borrowers and made loans
that in th.e light of future developments were far out of line
with the long-term earning power of the farms and ranches
financed.
In the cut-over areas of the Lake states, where settlement con-
tinued into the twenties, and in southeastern Oklahoma, mis-
takes were made during the World War I period that were
in some respects similar to those made in settling the Great
Plains. Usually there was not the problem of adjusting size of
farm and production practices to the requirements of a semi-
arid climate, although in southeastern Oklahoma many farm
units were established that were much too small for efficient
operation. But there were limitations both in the cut-over
country and in southeastern Oklahoma imposed by the char-
acter and quality of the soils, which, over large areas, are rela-
tively unproductive. A short growing season and occasional dry
years constitute additional limitations in parts of the cut-over
country. The settlers seem not to have recognized those limita-
tions; at least they did not take them sufficiently into account.
During the long period of rising agricultural prices and land
values that culminated in the wartime boom of 1915-20they
eagerly bought land and contracted debts in both areas on a
basis that could be justified only on the assumption that agri-
cultural prices would continue at high levels. Under the impact
of less favorable prices in the twenties and the price collapse
of the thirties, farm incomes fell to a point where borrowers in
these sections of relatively low yields could not meet their obli-188 CAUSES, ADJUSTMENTS, PROBLEMS
gations, and lenders acquired a large amount of farm real
estate.
For the most part, agriculture in the Pacific Coast states dur-
ing the interwar period appears to have been rather well ad-
justedto the widely varying soils and climatic conditions of the
region. Mistakes were made, however, during the period 1910-
20 in settling some of the areas in Washington and Oregon
east of the Cascades. Under the impetus of wartime prices and
favorable weather, crop farming pushed into a number of semi-
arid areas unsuited for it in the long run, just as it did in parts
of the Great Plains. Cut-over areas were settled that proved
capable of supporting little more than a subsistence type of
agriculture in normal times. In still other areas, irrigation works
were installed at considerable expense. Although production
was not usually a problem in the irrigated areas of the North-
west, except where drainage difficulties were encountered, taxes
for operation, maintenance, and debt service of irrigation dis-
tricts plus debt service on individual farm mortgages frequently
proved a greater financial burden than could be carried during
periods of low agricultural prices. In some areas, such as the
Wenatchee fruit section in central Washington, many individ-
uaII farm units were too small for efficient operation, and in
some cases orchards were planted on soils that proved to be
submarginal for fruit production except during periods of
high prices.
Natural Hazards
Unfavorable weather, noxious weeds, plant diseases, and insect
pests added greatly to farmers' debt difficulties in some sections
of the United States during the twenties and thirties. In periods
when agricultural prices are reasonably well adjusted to costs,
natural handicaps to production are seldom the sole cause of
farm mortgage foreclosure, although they are frequently a con-
tributing cause. In normal times, most farmers can survive an
occasional dry year or a season in which hot winds, hail, frost,
weeds, insects, or diseases reduce crop yields or even cause a
complete crop failure. But a series of poor crops, or even a
single crop failure following a number of years in which agri-
cultural prices have been at low levels, may result in financial
disaster.
In almost every year during the thirties some part of the
Great Plains was affected by drought, and in 1934and1936
the entire region suffered from droughts of unusual severity.CAUSES, ADJUSTMENTS, PROBLEMS 189
Even if agricultural prices had not been at low levels, it seems
clear that large numbers of farmers and ranchers would have
been unable to meet their financial obligations because of crop
failures. As it was, the combination of low prices and poor crops
resulted in severe and widespread farm mortgage distress in the
Great Plains between 1930 and 1940, and there was even an
emigration from the areas most affected.
Although drought does not appear to have been the direct
cause of many distress farm transfers outside the Great Plains
and Mountain states during the interwar period, it was un.
doubtedly a contributing factor in other areas, especially dur-
ing the first half of the thirties, when agricultural prices were
still relatively low and drought was widespread. In the same
period hot winds, hail, and frost reduced crop yields in a
number of areas and added to existing debt difficulties caused by
low agricultural prices. Severe winters in the middle thirties
killed large numbers of apple trees in western New York and
citrus trees in Florida, which undoubtedly led to some fore-
closures that would not otherwise have occurred.
Insect pests, noxious weeds, and plant and animal diseases
exact a heavy financial toll each year from American agricul-
ture. In some cases this toll takes the form of reduced produc-
tion; in others it takes the form of cash outlays to cover the
cost of control measures. Occasionally, an insect pest or disease
presents such a serious control problem that it forces far-reach-
ing changes in the agriculture of an area. The boll weevil ap-
pears to have precipitated such a change in parts of the Cotton
Belt during the interwar period. During World War I cotton
yields were good and farm incomes high in the eastern cotton-
producing states of Georgia and South Carolina. Both land
values and farm mortgage debt increased shar'ply in the two
states. Then came the price break of the early twenties, which
happened to coincide with severe boll weevil damage. Itis
estimated that in Georgia the reduction in cotton yields caused
by the boll weevil was 45 percent in 1921,44 percent in 1922,
and 37 percent in 1923. In South Carolina the greatest reduc-
tion was in 1922, estimated at 40 percent. At the same time,
prices received by farmers for cotton, which had averaged35.3
cents per pound during the 1919-20 marketing season, averaged
only 15.9 cents per pound during the 1920-2 1 season and 17.0
cents per pound during the 1921-22 season.4
4AgriculturalOutlook Charts_x95o (Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1949),
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Confronted with low cotton yields on the one hand and rela-
tively high costs and debt service charges on the other, farmers
in the eastern Cotton Belt were in serious financial straits dur-
ing the twenties even though cotton prices recovered from the
early postwar break and averaged 20.2 cents per pound during
the marketing seasons 1922-23 to 1929-30, inclusive. The need
for a shift from almost complete dependence on cotton as the
principal source of farm income in the eastern cotton states was
clearly indicated. But the problems of agricultural adjLlstment
were greatly complicated by the fact that the boll weevil forced
the beginnings of such a shift during a period of agricultural
depression. It is not surprising that there were many financial
failures in the eastern Cotton Belt during the interwar period
and that farm mortgage foreclosures and loss rates there were
among the highest in the United States.
High Fixed Costs
Virtually all types of farming in the United States are char-
acterized by fixed costs in varying degree, but there are certain
types of farming where fixed costs are high enough to contribute
substantially to farmers' financial problems in periods of de-
clining prices. Probably the most spectacular examples of debt
distress during the interwar period resulting from high fixed
costs were those in intensively farmed areas with expensive
drainage or irrigation projects. High taxes in drainage districts
were an important contributing cause of debt distress in the
delta areas in Arkansas and Mississippi. Farmers in some of the
irrigated sections of the Pacific Coast states found themselves
faced with a combination of high irrigation assessments and
extremely high mortgage debt charges, which contributed to
acute debt distress in that region.
Technological Change
Technological progress is commonly recognized as a primary
cause of American productivity and prosperity; yet it often
brings with it maladjustments that result in great hardship for
individuals. During World War I and the interwar period,
progress was rapid, both in agriculture and industry, and it
produced a number of notable maladjustments either by re-
ducing demand for specific products and services or by reduc-
ing unit costs for some producers, who were then able to under-
sell their less fortunate competitors.CAUSES, ADJUSTMENTS, PROBLEMS 191
An important technological advance in the twentieth century
was the development of synthetic fibers by the chemical in-
dustry, including rayon and nylon, which have partly taken the
place of natural fibers. Undoubtedly the synthetics exerted a
depressing effect on the price of natural fibers, including cot-
ton, and may, therefore, have contributed in a small way to
some of the distress that occurred in the Cotton Belt.
The development of automotive power had widespread ef-
fects on agriculture. It had an immediate effect on farmers who
produced hay for sale in cities and in deficit hay-producing areas
such as the South. There were many commercial hay growers in
the Northeast, some of whom were able to turn their farms to
other uses, while others were forced out of business entirely.
But automotive power had an even more important effect on
methods of production and hence costs. Tractors supplanted
work animals on the farm, which reduced costs in many cases
and released thousands of acres of land previously used for
growing feed for draft animals.
The shift to tractor power clearly increased the efficiency of
farmers who were able to take full advantage of the new ma-
chine methods. Conversely, those who were unable to use mod-
ern machinery to advantage, either because of topography, or
of small holdings, or for other reasons, were placed at a compet-
itive disadvantage.
Many technological advances seem to have had the effect of
increasing differentials in the economic value of different grades
of land being used for the same type of farming. There is con-
siderable evidence that within type-of-farming areas, techno-
logical changes during the interwar period increased operating
incomes relatively more on farms with few production handi-
caps than on less well adapted farms. The introduction of
hybrid seed corn, for example, effected the greatest increases
in corn yields and farming returns in those parts of the Corn
Belt with climate and soils best adapted to corn production.
Likewise, better control of plant diseases and insect pests and
use of commercial fertilizers increased the production of market-
able fruit per acre more for orchards with deep, well-drained
soils than for orchards with poorly drained soils. Such develop-
ments may explain in part the better than average loan experi-
ence on the more productive land classes. Even if earning coy-
erage had been the same on comparatively poor as on. good land
in 1920, it appears that by the early thirties the poor land in192 CAUSES, ADJUSTMENTS, PROBLEMS
many type-of-farming areas would have been at a decided dis-
advantage through its lesser share in technological gains.
There are examples, of course, of technological changes that
increased the earning power of land with physical production
handicaps more than the earning power of land with few such
handicaps; but within type-of-farming areas there appear to
have been few cases of that kind compared to the number where
the reverse situation developed.
Mistakes in Making Loans
Much of the debt distress that developed during the interwar
period istraceable to overlending, particularly during the
World War I period. Loans were made that seemed sound at the
time, but later proved excessive in terms of long-term earning
power. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that over-
lending occurred more frequently on farms and in areas with
marked production than on farms and in areas with
few limitations. Studies of farm income, including those re-
viewed in Chapter 7, offer numerous examples of type-of-farm-
ing areas where farms on the less productive grades of land
earned a lower rate of return and had less loan carrying capacity
than farms on the better grades. And statistical studies of lend-
ing experience have shown repeatedly that mortgages made on
the less productive farms within an area were more likely to
end in foreclosure and serious loss than mortgages on the more
productive farms.
It is often suggested that the poor financial experience ob-
served on less productive farms and in less productive areas is
due to an inability of the farm land market, at least in the
past, to differentiate adequately among individual farms in an
area or among neighboring areas with different degrees of
productivity. Failure to allow fully for differences in prodiic-
tivity seems likely to be especially important in newly settled
areas and during periods of rapid technological and economic
change. As a result of such failures, it is argued, farms in the
less productive land classes are likely to sell in many instances
for more than their long-term earnings prospects would justify
even after appropriate adjustments for differences in home
values and related amenities; and if loans are made on these
farms on the basis of appraised market value, they are almost
certain to be excessive loans.
Limitations imposed by soils, climate, topography, or location.CAUSES, ADJUSTMENTS, PROBLEMS 193
But why should the farm land market have difficulty in set-
ting values that accord with earnings prospects? Farm land is a
highly variable commodity, with no two farms exactly alike.
Differences in soils and climate, which may have an important
bearing on farming returns, are not always recognized by the
prospective buyer, or if recognized, may not be taken sufficiently
into account in arriving at an offering price for a particular
farm. Even if information concerning past earnings is available,
which is seldom the case, it is difficult to disentangle and give
proper weight to factors that may alter earning power in the
future. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that even
professional appraisers sho•ul.d make mistakes in estimating the
earning prospects of individual farms, or even of whole areas.
Although mistakes of all sorts may occur, there is one type
that is particularly likely to result in eventual mortgage dif-
ficulty. It is the overappraisal of a marginal farm. The opposite
type of error, which occurs when a high grade farm is under-
appraised or sold at a bargain price, is naturally much less
likely to result in difficulty.
Accurate appraisals are especially difficult in areas where
soils are highly variab]e or in areas characterized by local varia-
tions in climate. An example is the fringe area between the
cut-over country and dairy belt of the Lake states, which has
highly variable soils. Much of the distress that developed there
during the interwar period appears to have been the result of
the failure of the early settlers and lenders to distinguish the
better agricultural land from land with serious production
limitations.
But the frequency with which overpricing of poor land seems
to occur suggests that there is more involved than mere random
errors of appraisal or lack of knowledge on the part of new
settlers. Some writers have argued that the errors of appraisal
are not random at all, but are biased in the direction of over-
valuation of poor land and undervaluation of good land. A
possible alternative view is that overvaluation of poor land is
apt to occur mainly in periods of prosperity and inflation. It
is a plausible view because, obviously, land that is inferior or
marginal in the long run may earn a very handsome rate of
return during temporary periods of high prices for agricultural
products. If, in addition, land values in general are undergoing
a speculative rise, the values of inferior or marginal land are
almost certain to rise too.194 CAUSES, ADJUSTMENTS, PROBLEMS
The argument has to be taken largely on its logical merits,
for there are no series showing movements of land values for
different grades of land. Nevertheless, there is evidence that
just such a development occurred in northern Missouri and
southern Iowa (area G in Figure 23, Chapter i) where fore-
closures were notoriously high during the interwar period. The
area is better than marginal, but at the same time it is definitely
inferior to central Iowa, because of rough topography or poor
drainage. Yet when the speculative land boom struck central
Iowa, southern Iowa and northern Missouri were greatly af-
fected, and eventually land values reached levels that might
have been justified under World War I prices for corn and
hogs, but proved thoroughly unsound under prices prevailing
for the next two decades. It is generally believed that a similar
phenomenon of temporary speculative overappraisal occurs re-
peatedly in the stock market. During a bull market and business
revival, normally low-priced securities of corporations with poor
long-term earnings prospects are likely to rise rapidly as earn-
ings reports begin to show substantial improvement. Ordinarily
the low grade securities rise much faster than the rest of the
market, which gives rise to the famous "square root" law.° But
as soon as the market decides that the period of high earnings
is temporary and that the low grade securities are, therefore,
overvalued, they fall in price, perhaps even more rapidly than
they rose.
Not all of the mistakes in making mortgage loans on land
with production handicaps result from improperly appraising
the market value of such land, however. People buy farms for
many reasons besides obtaining a financial return, and the
nonfinancial considerations also influence land values. Further-
more, some buyers may appraise properly the differences be-
6Thelaw states that prices of variously priced stocks rise in such a way that
changes in their square roots tend to be constant. Thus, in a strong bull market,
the likelihood that a low-priced stock selling at $g will eventually reach $36
isas great as the likelihood that a high-priced stocksellingat $Biwill
eventually reach $144.Theincreaseinthe square rootforthe $g stock
—=6 —=3) is the same as the corresponding increase for the
$8i stock —=12—= 3);yet the price increases amount to
percent for the $g stock and only 78 percent for the $8i stock. Cf. "The Relation-
ship between Price Change and Price Level for Common Stocks," by Zenon
Szatrowski, in Journal of the American Statistical Association (Vol. 40, No. 232,
Parti,December1945,pp.467-83), and "Finding Actual Price Distortions:
Simple 'Square Root' Formula Equalizes Varying Percentage Movements," by
Harry D. Corner, in Barron's National Business and Financial Weekly (Vol. 24:
March 13, 1944, p. i6; March 20,'944,p. 7).CAUSES, ADJUSTMENTS, PROBLEMS 195
tween farms in earning capacity and yet have insufficient pur-
chasing power to compete for the better ones. If well-informed
buyers with limited capital compete for the cheaper farms,
instead of retiring from the land market altogether, the result
is that farms with recognized production limitations may con-
sistently sell for prices that are high in relation to earning
power. It d.oes not follow that these farms are overpriced or that
market appraisals of them for loan purposes are erroneous. The
problem here is one of adjusting size of loan to debt paying
capacity, which can be achieved by limiting the amount loaned
to a smaller fraction of appraised market value than that con-
sidered safe for the more productive properties.
Recent A djustments
Since 1914,whenthe outbreak of World War I began to set
the stage for the debt distress following 1920,therehave been
a number of developments in American agriculture that appear
to have mitigated, at least to some extent, the price and produc-
tion hazards of farming. A few of these may be mentioned.
i. Government farm price support programs have been in-
troduced, which, if continued, will have a stabilizing effect on
the prices of the products supported. Many farm products are
not eligible for price support, however. Nor is it by any means
certain that prices can or will be supported at levels that will
permit farmers to pay off heavy debts contracted during in-
flationary periods such as the present.
2. Great advances have been made in controlling plant and
animal diseases, insect pests, and weeds. Control measures are
often costly, but they promise greater freedom from catastrophic
losses in the future.
3. Although science has been able to do nothing yet to pre-
vent recurring droughts in the Great Plains and elsewhere, it
has provided better varieties of wheat, new techniques of con-
serving moisture, and machine methods that facilitate combin-
ing small holdings into units of economic size. All these tend
to mitigate the effects of drought. In areas where rainfall is
sometimes excessive, it has been possible through the use of
modern farm machinery to reduce production losses substanti-
ally by expediting operations during intervals between periods
of bad weather.
4. Government crop insurance schemes may eventually en-
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from catastrophic crop failure. At present, however, crop in-
surance is on an experimental basis; it is available in a rather
small number of counties, and it covers only a few staple crops.
Naturally, insurance premiums are high in areas of high risk,
but since they are a budgetable expense, they could be a help
to borrowers and lenders in the attempt to adjust loans to farm
incomes. So far, however, farmers in high risk areas have been
reluctant to pay the necessary premiums.
Agreat deal more is known today about production limita-
tions imposed by soils and climate than ever before. Soil maps
and weather records are more generally available, and those
who are willing to take pains in using them can avoid the worst
errors of purchasing farms or making loans on land with pro-
duction limitations. During the past twenty-five years a great
deal of effort has been expended on improving appraisal prac-
tices and loan standards.
6. In the South (a chronic trouble area during the interwar
period) adjustments have been made possible by wartime pros-
perity and shifts of population, by research, and by federal
farm programs. These adjustments have had the effect of re-
ducing dependence on a single crop, and will, no doubt, di-
minish future price and production risks for southern farming
to some extent.
7. One interesting development during the World War II
boom has been the apparent awareness of both borrowers and
lenders of dangers in overborrowing. This was particularly
noticeable in the Great Plains, where substantial reductions in
mortgage debt occurred (see Tablesand 4, in Introduction).
Certainly reduced mortgage debts do not affect the likelihood
of production failures or price declines in the future, nor do
they relieve farmers from the necessity of going in debt in case
of future difficulties; but the existence of a moderate debt
structure does increase the ability of agriculture to withstand
future hardships that are almost certain to develop. It remains
to be seen, of course, whether the awareness of borrowers and
lenders of the dangers in overexpansion of credit is temporary
or permanent.
8. Recognition of the fact that mortgage default is often the
result of failure to adjust mortgage terms to probable repay-
ment ability, or of broad economic or climatic forces over which
the individual farmer has no control, has resulted in institu-
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default and to temper the consequences of such default. Farm
mortgages in increasing proportion are being written on a long-
term amortized basis with instalments better adjusted to the
probable flow of farm income available for debt service charges.
Many mortgages carry provisions for deferment of payments
if the farmer, through no fault of his own, is unable to meet
them. Some mortgages provide for variable payments directly
geared to fluctuations in farm income. During the thirties the
federal government refinanced large numbers of distressed farm
mortgages, and provision undoubtedly will again be made for
refinancing operations of that kind in the event of another major
depression or widespread crop failures. Most states passed mora-
torium legislation during the thirties, and in a few instances
deficiency judgments were outlawed or restricted as to terms.
Legislation providing for the insurance of farm mortgages has
been passed, but has not been used extensively so far. Mort-
gage insurance would no doubt reduce the lender's risk: wheth-
er it would reduce the borrower's is another question.
These and other adjustments will naturally be expected to
exert a considerable influence on the incidence of farm mort-
gage distress in the future. Possibly they will tend to reduce the
general severity of distress, as is hoped, and probably they will
alter the geographical pattern of distress that characterized the
interwar period. But the amount of reduction and the extent
of the alteration are necessarily uncertain. It is relatively easy,
in reviewing the past, to point out most of the forces that have
contributed to heavy foreclosures and losses, and the counter-
active adjustments that have developed. But it is less easy to
determine whether the same forces are still operative, and it is
extremely difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of the adjust-
ments__especially since many of them have not yet been tested
in the fire of a severe agricultural depression.
Continuing Problems
It is obvious that, in the last analysis, farm mortgages default
and are foreclosed because farm incomes fail to achieve expecta-
tions. A review of farm mortgage loan experience in the United
States during the interwar period indicates many causes for
mortgage distress, which have one common characteristic. In one
way or another they all contribute to the instability and un-
certainty of farm incomes, so that prospective buyers, borrowers,
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It is clear that the central problem of farm mortgage lending
has been and continues to be the forecasting of future trends
of agricultural prices and incomes. Although production fail-
ures, notably in the Great Plains, have contributed greatly to
farm mortgage difficulties, nevertheless the widespread financial
distress in agriculture during the interwar period was primarily
the result of failure to anticipate the extent of price declines
from previously existing levels.
In addition to the problem of forecasting the long-term
agricultural outlook, farm lenders are confronted with the un-
certainties created by rapid technological change in an industry
with millions of small producing units, no two of which are
exactly alike and no two of which are affected in precisely the
same manner by new developments. This situation greatly
complicates the problem of obtaining accurate appraisals, on
either a market value or a capitalized earnings basis. There is
every reason to believe that the twin problems of making ac-
curate appraisals and adjusting loans to repayment ability will
continue to be difficult in the future, even if less difficult than
in the past.